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ABSTRACT
On a Friday that the Fed announces a money supply greater than had
been anticipated, interest rates move up in response. Why? One
explanation is that the market perceives the fluctuation in the money
stock as an unintended deviation from the Fed's target growth rate that
will be reversed in subsequent periods. The anticipation of this future
tightening drives up interest rates today. A second explanation is that
the market perceives the increase in the money supply as signalling a
higher target growth rate. The expected future inflation rate rises,
which is reflected in a higher nominal Interest rate.
This paper offers grounds for choosing between the two possible
explanations: evidence from the exchange market. Under the first
explanation, anticipated future tightening, one would expect the dollar
to appreciate against foreign currencies. Under the second explanation,
expected inflation, one would expect it to depreciate. We render these
claims more concrete by a formal model, a generalization of the
Dornbusch overshooting model. Then we use the mark/dollar rate to
answer the question. We find a statistically significant tendency for
the dollar to appreciate following positive money supply surprises.
This supports the first explanation.
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1. Whydoesthe interest rate rise after announcements of money growth?
One striking empirical regularity in recent years has been the tendency
for interest rates to rise whenever the Federal Reserve Board announces an
increase in the money supply greater than had previously been expected.
This relationship appears almost every week in credit market developments
as reported in the financial press, and is borne out by Table 4below.1 At
first glance, the phenomenon might seem puzzling to a student of textbook
IS—LM models, which predict that liquidity effects should make interest
rates fall when the authorities expand the money supply. At second glance,
however, the student should realize that there is not necessarily an in-
consistency. Interest rates may indeed fall during a week in which the
Fed increases the money supply. But when the announcement occurs ten days
later, interest rates will change purely because the announcement alters
the market's expectations of future monetary policy.
There is, in fact, an explanation of this weekly occurrence that is
consistent with the Keynesian (IS—LM) view that tighter money causes the
real interest rate to rise. Money growth that is faster than expected by
the market is trpical1y faster than what was expected by the Fed as well.
Weekly blips in the money supply are unintended errors——due to fluctuations
in private money demand or in the banking system——beyond the monetary
authorities' control. The Fed subsequently corrects the errors to bring
the money supply back in line with its target growth rates. Thus the
announcement of a large money supply increase generates the expectation
of future contraction in credit, and higher interest rates. In antici-
pation, interest rates jump on bonds with terms that include the period
in which money markets will be tighter. The fact that rates on even very2
short—term bonds increase indicates a belief that the Fed wastes no time in
beginning to correct errors.2
This explanation of the announcement effect on interest rates is
commonly given by staff writers of the Wall Street Journal, especially in
the Monday column on credit markets.
The Federal Reserve System may be forced to boost the dis-
count rate from 12% in its battle to halt the soaring growth of
the nation's money supply...Fears of Fed credit tightening sent
the markets reeling Friday after release of the latest money
supply statistics. Prices of long—term U.S. government bonds
tumbled by more than a point, or $10 for each $1,000 face amount
of securities. Interest rate increases ofpercentage point
were common on short—term securities. (January 25, 1982)
However, there is a second, very different, explanation of the
phenomenon that, ironically, is propounded in the same newspaper, but in
the editorial column. The announcement of rapid money growth causes the
market to raise its estimate of the Fed's target money growth rate, the
expected inflation rate rises, and it is reflected in a higher nominal
interest rate.
A reduction in money growth will constrict the supply of
credit, but it will also lower inflationary expectations.
If the markets are convinced the Fed is really serious about
slowing money growth, the drop in the inflationary premium
will swamp the impact on the real rate of interest, and
nominal rates will tall. This is precisely what seems to
be happening this week in the wake of the latest money
supply figures. (January 7, 1981)
One might think of other ways of describing the positive correlation
between money announcements and interest rate changes. But they can be
seen to fall into the category of one or the other of these two competing3
explanations, if one groups them by reference to the decomposition of the
nominal interest rate into the real interest rate and the expected infla-
tion rate. According to the first explanation, a large money announcement
raises the nominal interest rate because it raises the real interest rate.
We will refer to this as the liquidity effect. According to the second
explanation, the announcement raises the nominal interest rate because it
raises expected inflation. We will refer to this as the inflation premium
effect.
It would be useful to be able to distinguish between the two hypo-
theses, since they might give an indication of how the market views the
Fed's policies. The liquidity effect requires that the market expect the
Fed to stick to its pre—announced money growth target and to correct any
aberration. The inflation premium explanation implies that the Fed is
not trusted to keep a steady course; the market, like the Wall Street
Journal editors, is ready to interpret any deviation in money growth as
a signal that the Fed is changing its targets.
Fortunately, there is a quite simple way to choose between the two
hypotheses. If expected inflation increases, then the value of the dollar
should fall (the exchange rate should rise) as demand for the currency
declines. On the other hand, if tight monetary policy causes the real
interest rate to rise, then a capital inflow should cause an appreciation
of the dollar. Thus, if the inflation premium view is correct, the exchange
rate should have the same positive correlation with money announcements
that the interest rate has. If the liquidity view is correct, the exchange
rate should have the opposite correlation with the other variables.3
Section 2 of this paper formalizes the intuitive argument that the4
exchange rate depends on the expected future path of the money supply. The
model is a generalization of Frankel's (1979) synthesis of Jacob Frenkel's (1976)
monetarist version and Rudiger Dornbusch's (1976) Keynesian version, of the
monetary approach to exchange rate determination. The reader familiar with
this literature, or willing to accept the intuitive argument, is strongly
encouraged to skip directly to the empirical results in Section 3.There,
it is discovered that the evidence strongly favors the liquidity effect.
2. A model of the exchange rate's dependence on monetary
tightness
In this section we illustrate in a particular model how the exchange
rate jumps in response to changes in the general perceived future path of
monetary policy. Thus in the case where announcements of unexpectedly large
money supplies are interpreted as increases in the Fed's target money growth
rate, the exchange rate increases. In the case where such announcements are
interpreted as transitory deviations bringing future contraction, the ex-
change rate falls.




Here m and p are the logs of the money supply and price level, i is
the very short—term interest rate and. a represents the influence of real
income and other exogenous shifts in money demand.
In a flexible—price monetarist world, the combination of purchasing
power parity in rate—of—change form and interest rate parity (equation (6)
below) would tie the domestic interest rate to the foreign interest rate,
with an allowance for expected inflation. Then the domestic price level Pt5
would be determined by the money demand equation (1) and a money supply
process.
We are going to allow prices to be sticky, to be prevented from jumping
at a moment in time. Thus purchasing power parity does not hold in the
short run. But prices adjust to excess demand over time, so purchasing
power parity does hold in long—run equilibrium:
(2) s=p,
where s is the log of the equilibrium spot exchange rate, is the log
of the domestic equilibrium price level, and the log of the foreign equilib-
rium price level is taken as exogenous and is here normalized at zero. The
domestic equilibrium price level is in turn defined by the stable ("no
bubble") rational expectations solution to
—_X[E+i
— +i*] + a
where Et+i —isthe aquilibrium inflation rate expected at time t
and i is the foreign interest rate, also taken to be exogenous. This is
a logical way to determine p ,becauseit is the way we would determine p
in a flexible—price world.
We find the rational expectations solution as follows. Solve equation
(3) for Pt in terms of Et+j .Thensubstitute the solution for
in terms of Etpt+2 .Continuingto substitute recursively, we obtain
(4) = ()T E(m+ —a+T)+ Xi*
T=O
We see that p is an indicator of how expansionary the entire future path
of money supply is expected to be relative to money demand. As an example,
if money supply and demand are expected to be constant atm and a6
respectively, then p is simply m —a+ Xi .Belowwe will consider
two alternative specific money supply processes to narrow down the range of
possibilities under (4).
Now we are going to see how changes in the unobservable are
reflected as changes in the observable s .Weassume a form of regressive




Inthe long—run equilibrium, when s —= 0,thespot rate s is of course
expected to increase at the rate of the equilibrium spot rate s ,whichwill
be the same as the rates of increase of the equilibrium price level (by pur-
chasing power parity) and money supply (by money demand homogeneity). But
in the short run, if the spot rate exceeds what the market considers its
equilibrium path (s —s< 0) ,thenthe currency is thought to be "under-
valued," and is expected in the future to appreciate (Es+i —s
< 0)
relative to the equilibrium path at a rate that is proportional to the gap.
(5) is of the general form that expectations are assumed to take in Frankel
(1979) and Mussa (1977). In our appendix it is shown to be precisely the
rational form for expectations to take when the system contains an equation
specifying the price level to adjust gradually according to an excess demand
function plus a term for the equilibrium inflation path.




Returnto the money demand function (1). An announcement of monetary growth
at time t ,asopposed to the event itself over the preceding period, does
not change the money supply, or the price level or real money demand, and
thus does not change the short—term interest rate i Thus,by (6) it
does not change expected depreciation Ets÷1 —s
,whichin turn is the8
establishes that s jumps with .Ifthe announcement of an unexpectedly
high money supply induces the public to raise its expectation of future money
supplies relative to money demand, a sudden increase in s will tell us so.
On the other hand, if the announcement induces expectation of monetary con-
traction in the near future, a sudden fall in s will tell us so.
To make these two cases more concrete we now consider two particular
alternative money supply processes. Both involve a target path for the money
supply with growth rate
(9) m_rn1+1J
In both cases we also assume here that real money demand a follows a
random walk; to get our results (qualitatively) it is sufficient that a
be autocorrelated. (Recall that a includes real income.)
Under money supply process "A," the Fed succeeds in hitting its money
supply target even on a weekly basis, but the Fed keeps changing the target
growth rate according to a random walk:
(lOa) m =
(ha) = +v
This implies Em+T =m
+ .Ifwe use this money supply process in
equation (4), we find that the announcement of a money supply 1% greater
than expected raises by X% :6
(12a) — = — E,m)
.
Intuitively,under money supply process A ,theannouncement of m is inter-
preted as a one—for—one increase in the steady—state inflation rate, which
reduces steady—state real money demand——or raises the equilibrium price level
——by that amount times the semi—elasticity of money demand. From (8):7
left—hand side of (5):
(5') 0 =O((s
— — (s—se'))+ (Est+1 —E,s+i)
—t —
wherewe are using t'to denote the value of a variable the instant before
the announcement.












Theexpression in brackets is the revision in the market's expected equilib-
rium inflation rate. The equilibrium money demand equation (3) tells us,
with tn ,i
,anda tied down, that the effect of the announcement on
the market's expected equilibrium inflation rate is related to the effect on




Wecombine (3') and (7):
(8) s —s,
=(1+ 1/X8) tp —
Equation(8) is the promised result that revisions in p ,theindicator of
expected future credit conditions, cause proportional jumps in the spot ex-
change rate. The equation is a generalization of Dornbusch's celebrated over-
shooting result that an unanticipated increase in the money supply causes an
equilibrium increase in the exchange rate of the same percentage, and in addi-
tion causes the current exchange rate to overshoot its equilibrium by iiXB
We could stop here. Equation (4) establishes p as an indicator of
the entire expected future path of monetary policy and equation (8)10
l+x 0
(13b) S— S = —
0(l+A)(m —E,m)
In this case, the dollar appreciates with the announcement of an unexpected-
ly high money supply ——theopposite from case A.
With either money supply process A or B, the nominal rate of interest
would increase with a higher—than—anticipated money supply announcement.
However, with process A it would be the inflation premium that would rise,
while in case B the real rate would jump. (This is demonstrated formally in
the Appendix.) The two processes are distinguishable by their differing im-
plications for exchange rate movements.
3. Empirical tests of announcement effects
The market's anticipation of the next money growth announcement is
determined not only by the most recent money supply figures, but by many
other factors as well. Any attempt to measure expected money growth by,
for example, an ARIMA model of the money supply time series, is unlikely
to be accurate. It turns out that there is a very convenient measure of
the market's opinion of what the Fed is going to announce. Money Market
Services, Inc., each week surveys sixty individuals who make predictions
of what the announcement will be. It is these survey numbers that we use as
our measure of expected money growth.
It would add to the credibility of the survey numbers if we could
show that they are unbiased predictors of the actual money supply announce-
ments. Grossman has recently shown that the Money Market Services forecasts
are unbiased for the period September 1977—September 1979. Table 1 shows
some simple tests performed on an updated time sample. The first regres-





The announcement of an unexpectedly high money supply in this case causes an
immediate depreciation of the dollar.
Under the alternative of money supply process "3", the Fed sticks to its
pre—set target growth rate, but the actual money supply deviates from the
target due to unintended weekly fluctuations
(lOb) m tn + u
(lib)
If we use this money supply process in equation (4), we find that the announce-
ment of a money supply 1% greater than expected reduces Pt by X/(l+X)
x (12b) Pt — = —
(tnt
—E,m)
Intuitively, under money supply process B, the announcement is interpreted
as requiring a one—for—one contraction in the following period. It is true
that the public has discovered the money supply in the most recent period to
be higher than it had estimated. But it necessarily discovers at the same
time that money demand at is higher than it had thought. Under our assump-
tion that at is autocorrelated, the upward shift in money demand is expected
to remain next period. But under our assumption of money supply process B,
the money supply is anticipated to shift back next period. In expression (4),
representing the expected present discounted sum of present and future credit
market conditions, expected money supply has fallen relative to expected money
demand. This tightening in expectations of monetary policy is reflected in
a sudden fall in p .From(8)12
announcement effect. However, we will certainly not get a perfect fit;
other factors will contribute to the changes. The question is whether the
errors that do intervene in the relationship are independent of the monetary
forecast errors. There is an excellent reason to believe that they are:
both the announced money supply figures and their forecasts as measured by
Money Market Services are predetermined, by several days, at the time that the
announcement is made. A claim of econometric exogeneity on the part of the
monetary forecast error can be supported by a Granger causality test. A
necessary condition for monetary forecast errors to be exogenous with respect
to a particular variable is that, after taking account of the information in the
lagged forecast errors, the variable in question does not help predict the
forecast error. Table 3 shows that neither the interest rate nor the ex-
change rate Granger—causes the monetary forecast error.
Having confirmed the desirable properties of the monetary forecasts,
we now proceed to the main results of the paper. Table 4 attempts to
confirm the empirical regularity on which the paper is predicated: the
positive dependence of interest rate changes on monetary announcements.
The interest rate is the one—month Eurodollar rate, and we look at the
change from 10 a.rn. on the day of the announcement (which is made at 4 p.m.)
to 10 a.m. the following day. The sample period is restricted to October
1979 to August 1981. The coefficient in the regressions is positive, and,
when estimated by Cochrane—Orcutt, is significant at the 90% level. Some-
what stronger results were obtained by Grossman using Treasury bill rates
that were recorded at 3:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on announcement days.
Table 5 presents the regression of the change in (the log of) the
dollar/mark exchange rate between 12:00 noon the day of the announcement
and 12:00 noon the following day, against the monetary announcement fore—11
August 1981 was different from zero. The next two equations test for
information in lagged forecast errors.7 In no case is any coefficient sig-
nificantly different from zero, supporting the unbiasedness of the forecasts.
The money forecasts are actually made on Tuesdays, while money supply
figures were released usually on Thursdays until February 1980, and usually
on Fridays after then. Ideally, we would like to know the market's guess
at the money supply immediately before the announcement. Money Market
Services, Inc., believes that little new information comes in between
Tuesday and Friday to change market opinions. The previous week's money
supply figures have already been released and digested, and most other rele-
vant information, such as observed interest rate changes, should have come
in the week that the change in the money supply actually occurred. To
test this claim, it is possible to check whether the exchange rate or the
interest rate on the morning of the announcement contairs any information
that would improve the prediction. Table 2 reports regressions of the
forecast error on various combinations of the exchange rate and the in-
terest rates, and lagged values of those two variables and the forecast
error. F—statistics indicate an inability to reject the null hypothesis
that all coefficients including the constant are zero. Thus, these guesses
at the soon—to—be—revealed money stock numbers are efficient with respect
to some obvious potential sources of information.8
Before we examine the effect of monetary.announcements (in excess of
their forecasted values) on interest rate and exchange rate changes, we
should pause to consider why we are treating the monetary forecast errors
as the independent variable. If our observations of the financial vari-
ables are taken close enough in time, before and after, to the announce-
ment, then we can hope that the changes are explained largely by the14
supplies, real income levels, interest rates and inflation rates. A signi-
ficant negative coefficient on the interest rate indicates a rejection
of perfectly flexible prices (e.g., Frankel (1979)). One difficulty with
this approach is that there are serious simultaneity problems with con-
sidering the interest rate and expected inflation rate as independent
variables. And instrumental variable techniques are only partial solutions
because it is hard to find exogenous variables.(A second difficulty is
that the results have proven to be sensitive to the particular currency
and sample period chosen.)
The results in Tables 4 and 5, when taken together, provide evidence
against the flexible—price view in a context free from simultaneity prob—
lems. Given just the positive correlation of monetary announcements and
interest rate changes, one could rationalize the flexible—price model by
arguing that unanticipated money growth raises expected future money
growth and thus raises expected inflation. Given just the negative cor-
relation of monetary announcements and exchange rate changes, one could
rationalize the flexible—price model by arguing instead that unantici-
pated money growth generates the expectation of future contraction, thus
reducing the expected inflation. But the two results taken together can
only be explained by granting a role to sticky prices and to fluctuations
in the real interest rate. Once again: the money growth announcement
causes the real interest rate to rise, which xplains both the rise in
the nominal interest rate and the fall in the exchange rate.13
cast error. The coefficient turns out to be negative, and highly significant.
So, on days when the money supply figures turn out to be greater than ex-
pected, the currency appreciates. This indicates that the real interest
rate rises: the nominal interest rate rises because of liquidity effects,
not because of the expected inflation premium.
4. Conclusion
The announcement phenomenon is a valuable tool for cutting through
the web of simultaneous causality that plagues much of empirical macro-
economics. The negative effect that the announcements have on the exchange
rate indicates that the market believes that the Fed has been following a
steady money growth policy, at least since October 1979. When the money
supply grows more rapidly than had been expected, the market assumes that
the Fed will reverse the error in the future, not that it has raised its
money growth target. The expectation of future tightening causes the
interest rate to rise and the exchange rate to fall.
The results of this paper also shed light on a second issue. It is
sometimes claimed that goods prices are flexible, and that fluctuations
in the interest rate mostly consist of fluctuations in the expected in-
flation rate, rather than the fluctuations in the real interest rate that
characterize a Keynesian model.1° In termsof the model developed in
Section2, the speed of adjustment O is th6ught to be close to infinite.
Changes in the nominal money supply or expected inflation rate are re-
flected immediately in the price level and real money supply, and thus have
no effect on the real interest rate. One way people have tested this view
of the world is to run a regression of the exchange rate against money16
(A6) pt÷i =Pt+ (E+i — — —




Again,using long—run PPP (2):
(A7) =+Es1 —s+ —
Thisfo'rm of the price—adjustment equation is helpful in deriving the
interest—rate relations.
We assume that the n—period ahead interest rate, nt ,issimply the
average of the expected one—period rates for the next n—periods.
(A8) i =[Es —s]+1* ntn tt+ntnt
From (A7):
(A9)Es÷ =Ep÷+ (1 —O)E(si
— = Ep+ (1—0)n(
—
Then,from (A2):
(AlO) (Ep — Ep+)
— + (1+-)Etpt
Substitutingfrom (A9) and rearranging:
(l—e) — Es — ( —s)+E tt+n l+AOtt.1tt+n
Takingexpectations at t' and subtracting (and using the fact that Pt =
ESt
—E,st(fl (s —sr,)+ Etpt —Et,p
Using (A8)15
Appendix
In this appendix we show that expectations of the form of (5) are con-
sistent with a Mussa (1981) price—adjustment equation.11 We also derive the
change in the real and nominal interest rates for money supply processes A
and B of section 2.
Substitute the uncovered interest parity relation (6) into the money
demand function (1), and subtract (1) from (3):
0 =
Pt
















Subtracting (A2) from (A3) yields:
(A4) Es+i —s
—(Etst÷i
— = — — —— )J
Using(Al) and (A4) and rearranging we have:
(AS) Ep+i =Pt+ (E÷i — — e —
(AS)is consistent with a Mussa—type price—adjustment equation:18
Since
(l—0)>l—n0
the interest rate will move the same direction as the unexpected change in
the money supply. In this case, the rise is entirely attributable to an
increase in the inflation premium since:
-((1_0)fl-1)(1+X0) (A17a) r —r=ci.(m —E — <0 nt nt*1 tt
n+A(l-(1_0)fl)> 0 (A18a) —'ii,= 1(m—E,m)
= ntnt
For money supply process B,
(Al5b) Etp —Etip
=— Cm—Em ) t+n ttt







thismodel is also adequate to explain the observed movements of interest
rates on days of monetary announcements. In this case, though, the nominal
rate rises because of an increase in the real rate:


























Since (1 —0)fl — 1<0,theexchange rate always moves the opposite direc-
tion of the real rate of interest when new money stock figures are revealed.
Let be the inflation premium on n—period bonds:
1
nt =— (Ep—
Subtracting(A13) from (All), it follows from (A12):
1 —XO(l—e)' 1 — —





For money supply process A, it can be shown from (4)
(Al5a) Etpt_ Et,pt =(n+ X)(m —E,nr)
Substituting (A15a) and (l3a) into (All) we get:
(A16a) —n1t'(1_8)fl
nO—1 —E,m)20
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A possible alternative solution to the problem is to abandon the re-
quirement that the money demand equation hold exactly in the short run and
to model explicitly the money multiplier process as a simultaneous equation
in in, thecurrent i ,andthe i's expected to prevail later in the
week or month. Banks react to a monetary announcement by expecting, e.g.,
contraction and a higher Fed funds rate later in the week, and thus by
raising their demand for reserves today, raising the Fed funds rate (and
lowering in)today.The fact that banks are allowed to average their
reserve holdings out over the week to meet reserve requirements explains why
they would drive today's Fed funds rate up to the level expected to prevail
later in the week. We are indebted to Dale Henderson for the banking story.
5. Between t—1and t'themoney supply changes occur and the money
demand errors occur. The announcement is made at t.Thesymbolt'is
really only a handy device that designates the values of the variables that
would hold at time t ,ifno money announcement had been made. Thus,
t+ 1is exactly one period away from t'forpurposes, say, of calculat-
ing interest rates.
6. We have used the fact that —E,mt)
=(a
—E,a),i.e.,that
the market's revision of the expected money supply carries with it a matching
revision in. expected money demand. This follows from the assumptions that
prices are sticky, interest rates are observable, and the money demand equa-
tion (1) holds.
Presumably the market has already used changes in the interest rate ob-
served during the week to estimate money supply less money demand, with the
breakdown (as to how much each is stimated to have changed) depending ra—21
Footnotes
1. The positive effect of unanticipated money announcements on interest
rate changes has also been documented recently by William Conrad (1981),
who uses an ARIMA process to measure expected money growth, and J. Grossman
(1981), who uses the same survey numbers that we do. More recently, it has
also been documented by Vance Roley (1982), Thomas Urich and Paul Wachtel
(1981), Urich (1982), Bradford Cornell (1982a), and Gikas Hardouvelis (1982).
2. This explanation is developed theoretically by Donald Nichols and David
Small (1982), as well as by many of the empirical papers listed in footnote 1.
3.The first version of this paper appeared January 4, 1982. Since then,
Bradford Cornell (1982b) has written a very similar paper.
4. One might legitimately ask how we hope to explain announcement effects
on the interest rate if it is tied down by the money demand equation. The
rationalization we are using here is that the interest rate i that gives
us instantaneous money market equilibrium is a very short—term interest
rate ——shorter—termthan the one—month short—term interest rate represented
by our data. An announcement that raised or lowered expected future money
growth could raise or lower the value that I is expected to have later in
the month (when p has had time to adjust fractionally), and thus raise or
lower today's one—month rate, without changing today's i .Thedisadvan-
tage with this rationalization is that announcement effects are in fact
observed for interest rates with a term as short as one day, e.g. the Fed
funds rate.24
tion to do so. Thus it seems appropriate to consider the post—October
period alone.
10. For example, Fama (1975) and Frenkel (1981). Of course there already
exists other evidence against the Fama view. See, for example, Nelson and
Schwert (1977).
11. In other words, our expectation equation (5) is of the form that is
rational in a system that includes a price—adjustment equation of the Mussa
form. An alternative way of showing this would be to begin with a price—
adjustment equation of the Mussa type and derive the rational expectations
solution. This is how Engel (1981) proceeds.23
tionally on the relative variance of the two. Still, the market gains a lot
of information when the true money supply is announced. When it does, the
revisions in its estimates of money supply and money demand must be equal.
7. The forecast error is the log of the actual announced money supply minus
the log of the predicted money supply. Actually, Money Market Services, Inc.,
supplied predicted changes in the money supply. These figures were added to
the current revised figures for the previous week, reported in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin, to get the predicted money supply.
8. In light of our finding that the survey data appear to be unbiased pre-
dictors of the actual money supply figures, one might be tempted to assume
rationality of expectations, and to examine the actual money supply process
directly. For example Pierce (1981) has found that the purely transitory
component is responsible for a standard deviation of$3.3billion in the
weekly money supply figures. However, the existence of transitory deviations
in the money supply is not sufficient to imply the announcement effect on
interest races. We would also need positive autocorrelation in money demand
innovations, as in the model of section 2 (or in the banking system innova-
tions, as in footnote 2). Simultaneous estimation of money supply and demand
equations might answer the question, but the technique used here is cleaner
and easier.
9. The Federal Reserve Board changed its operating procedure on October 6,
1979, abandoning the use of interest rates as- a guide to intervention in
money markets. The aim of this policy change, of course, was to enable it
to hit its money growth targets in the future, an aim that it had often
failed to achieve in the past, and to convince the market of its determina—26
Table 3
Causality Test
(Dependent variable: MFEt =logarithmicmonetary forecast error at t)
R2 D.W.
c MFE1MFE2MFE3MPE4MIN1MIN2 1.
.0073 —.154 —.024 —.038 -.089 —.023 -.041
(.0033) (.108) (.115) (.116) (.112) (.059) (.083)
MIN3MIN4MIN5MIN6
—.064 —.022 .086—.030 F(6,86) =1.50 .1151.99
c MFE1MFE2MFE3MFE4MEX4MEX2
.0017 —.069 .065 .0071 .083 .0042—.084
(.0038) (.107) (.109) (.109)(.106) (.037) (.053
MEX3MEX4MEX5MEX6
—.140 —.0060—.054 .0019 F(6,86) =1.44.1212.02
(.053 (.055) (.054) (.058)
Sample Period: October 1979 —August1981
Table 4
(Dependent variable: one—day change in eurodollar rate)
Regression MFE D.W. p
technique
R2
1. OLS .236 1.099
(.138)
.007
2. CORC .162 .456
(.110) (.091)
.206
Sample period: October 1979 —August1981
Table 5









Sample Period: October 1979 —August198125
Table 1
(Dependent variable: MFEt =logarithmicmonetary forecast error at t)
c MFE1 MFE2 R2 D.W.
1. —.00042 F(l,203) =1.42 0 2.05
(.00035)
2. —.00042 —.028 F(2,201) =0.76 .0008 2.00
(.00036) (.071)
3. —.00041 —.028 .014 F(3,199) =0.49 .0010 1.99
(.00036) (.071) (.072)
Sample period: Sept. 1977 —Aug.1981, weekly data
(Standard errors reported in parentheses.)
Table 2
(Dependent variable: MFEtlogarithmic forecast error at t)
MFE1
MINMIN1 HEX HEX1 R2 D.W.
1.—.00058 .0014 F(2,202) =0.72.00012.05
(.001) (.0092)
2.—.00048 .035—.035 F(3,200) =0.63.0027 2.07
(.0011) (.048)(.048)
3. —.00057—.028 .0013 F(3,200) =0.50.00092.00
(.0011) (.071) (.0093)
4. .00070 .0017 F(2,202) =0.81.00102.05
(.0025) (.0037)
5. .00069 —.0019 .0035 F(3,200) =0.52.00102.05
(.0026) (.024) (.024)
6. .00066—.029 .0016 F(3,200) =0.56.0017 1.99
(.0025) (.071) (.0037)
7. .00054 .0020 .0018 - F(3,201)=0.55.00122.05
(.0026) (.0093) (.0037)
Sample period: Sept. 1977 —Aug.1981, weekly data
MIN =1—montheurodollar rate on announcement morning
HEX =logNew York market bid exchange rate, announcement morning